REEMPLOYMENT RIGHTS OF THE VETERAN
Since the advent of the war in Korea and the repeated
calls for a greater number of men to serve in the Armed
Forces, the problem of reinstating the veteran in his former
job upon his return from the service becomes of special
importance. The provisions for the veterans' reemployment
are found in the Selective Service Act of 1948.1 Many of
the answers to the problems the veteran will face will be
found in the numerous cases arising out of the attempt of
the veteran of World War II to assert his reemployment
rights under the Selectivie Training and Service Act of 1940;
for very nearly the same provisions for reemployment, as
2
amended, were reenacted in the 1948 Act.

The problems arising under the provisions of the Act of
1940 have not all been solved and the litigation continues
at a steady pace. The purpose of this review is to summarize and analyze past decisions with an eye toward possible changes under the new provisions and to point out
areas of future difficulty.
We shall consider the problem as it will be encountered
by the veteran at three different stages upon his return to
his old employment, i.e. (1) the difficulties he encounters
in attempting to be reinstated with the employer, (2) under
what circumstances and when may he later be discharged
from that employment, and (3) the questions which arise
in connection with his seniority and other benefits after he
has been reinstated.
Certain general observations are necessary to an understanding of the problems faced by the courts in the decisions
to be analyzed. First, any decision must necessarily be made
in the light of the legislative policy underlying the provisions of the Act. Though this may be obvious, the underlying policy is not. If there were no collective bargaining
agreements and no seniority systems the problems would
be simple; for this much we know, that Congress wanted
the veteran to have his old job back. Beyond that we can
50
5 U.S.O. App. §459 (1948).
Provisions of the 1940 Act are found In 50 U.S.C. §308, as amended
56 Stat. 724 (1942), 58 Stat. 798 (1944), 60 Stat. 341 (1946).
2
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only speculate. There was a suggestion by Congressman
May that the Act was intended to preserve the seniority, of
the railroad workers and that they would be able to count
the time in the armed forces upon their retirement.3 The
Senators seemed to be less certain what the provisions really
meant.4 The fact remains that there were many gaps in the
law which could not be filled by anything the legislators had
said either in committee or elsewhere. What those gaps
were and how many of them remain will be pointed out.
Problems Connected With the Initial Reinstatement
The applicable provisions of the .1948 Act which must be
considered at this point are in §9 (b) which reads as follows:
"Ii the case of any such person who, in order t6 perform such training and service, has left or leaves a
position (other than a temporary position) in the employ of any employer and who (1) receives such certificate, and (2) makes application for reemployment
within ninety days after he is relieved from such training and service or from hospitalization continuing after
discharge for a period of not more than one year-...
(B) if such p obsition was in '.he. employ of a private
employer, such person shall -- (i) if still qualified to
.perform the duties-of such position, be restored by such
employer or his successor, n interest to such position or
to a position of like' seniority, status, and pay; ...
unless the employer's circumstances have so changed as
to make it impossible or unreasonable to do so." (The
italicized words indicate provisions which were not in
the 1940 Act.) 8
The first observation to be made is that the reemployment
provisions of the 1948 Act apply to inductees, enlistees,
and reservists who have entered upon active duty.8 There
are nearly identical provisions in §9 (b) (A) for those who
were in -the empldy of the United States Government prior
86 Cong. Rec. 11702 (1940).
86 Cong. Rec. 10107-10109 (1940), Sen. Rep. No. 2002, 76th Cong.,

3rd Sess. (1940).
5 §9(a) merely provides that upon completion of satisfactory train.
Ing and service the veteran shall be given a certificate to that effect,
which is required under the quoted provisions.
9 Inductees §9(a); enlistees 19(g)(1); and reservists §9(g)(2).

REEMPLOYMENT RIGHTS OF THE VETERAN

to their entry into the service. The Act is not retroactive,
i.e. it does not apply to those who entered the Armed Forces
prior to June, 1948, irrespective of the date of discharge.
Consequently the cases have all arisen under the provisions
of the Act of 1940.7

Generally the employer has not resisted the attempt of
the veteran to be reinstated in his old job. 'Where such resistance has been met, it has most often come from employers outside the mass production industry-though not always. Perhaps the simplest explanation of this is that in
the mass production industries the number of unskilled and
semi-skilled workers Is great," and to the employer one man
is as good as another so long as he is physically able to perform the work.
Where the employer has resisted the attempt of the veteran to be reinstated the courts have generally construed
the provisions liberally for the veteran. 9 The courts could
have just as easily gone the other way, for the provisions
quoted above contain a safety valve in the words, "unless
the employer's circumstances have so changed as to make it
impossible or unreasonableto do so." In other situations
courts have often utilized the word "unreasonable" to obtain
desired results, but it has been a rare occasion under the
reemployment provisions when the courts have fallen back
on this safety valve.' 0 In fact, it has been held that it makes
no difference that the particular job the veteran left is no
longer in existence, unless it can be shown that no job of
like seniority, status and pay exists."
Two general reasons might be advanced as the basis for
this attitude on the part of the courts. First, there is gen7 Cushnier v. Ford Motor Co., 89 F.Supp. 491 (E.D. Mich. 1950).
8 This fact is recognized as one which gave rise to the demand for

the seniority system. Mitclfem, Seniorty Clauses in Collective Bargaining Agreements, 21 Rocky Mt.L.Rev. 156 (1948).
' Said Justice Douglas in Fishgold v. Sullivan Drydock & Repair
Corp., 328 U.S. 275 (1946) at 285, "This legislation is to be liberally
construed for the benefit of those who left private life to serve their
country in its hour of greatest need."
I0 Olin Industries v. Barnett, 64 F.Supp. 722 (S.D. Ill. 1946); Kent
v. Todd Houston Shipbuilding Corp., 72 F.Supp. 506 (S.D. Tex. 1947).

In both cases the employer had ceased to produce war material and the
courts held there was such a change of circumstances.
u Kent v. Todd Houston Shipbuilding Corp., supra note 10.
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erally no out-of-pocket loss to the employer, (though there
may be a hardship to a non-veteran) and secondly, most
cases of this'type arose immediately after the war while
there was still a strong feeling that not enough could be
done for the veteran. There would seem to be no reason to
suppose that both of these considerations will not be present
to aid the veteran of the present conflct when he returns
home.
The more specific problems that have arisen in connection
with the above provisions are whether the veteran was an
employee or an independent contractor, whether the position was temporary, whether seasonal and casual workers
were excluded, whether the veteran held a "position" immediately prior to his entry into the service, and whether
those holding elective positions were included within the
provisions of the Act. 1
The courts have strained to find the veteran was in the
"employ" of the one witl whom he seeks to get back his
old job. They have found the following persons to be "employees": a rubbish hauler who came by once a week and
who had never been regarded by his customers's as their
"empoyee", an attorney who collected accounts and received
a galary and commission,1" and an attorney insurance adjuster who received regular wages.15 To pass on the question of whether a salesman is an employee or an independent
"For a collection of these cases up to 1948 see Freed, The Reem-

p/oynext Provi8im of the Selectve Service Act, 6 Wash. d Lee L. Rev.
48 (1%8).
isKam Y. Klein, 70 FSupp.469 (D.Minn. 1947).

u Myers Y.Barenburg, 68 F.Supp. 697 (D.Md. 1946).
= Jennings v. Mutual Casualty, 48 AML.C. 107 (1947); accord, Dodd

v. Williams, 68 F.Supp. 995 (D. Aria. 1946) (manager of a taxi business),
Refoer v. Interboro Savings & Loan Assoc., 166 F.2d 83 (3rd Cr. 1948)

(a company attorney), Clark v. Housing Authority of Port Orchard, 25
Wau.zd 419, 171 Pac.2d 217 (1946) (attorney who served as town
housing adthority at a stipulated monthly salary). When the veteran
replaces a non-veteran In his old Job he is entitled to the Incumbent's
rate of pay and not his old rate. Martin v. John S.Doane Co., 6R F.Supp.
788 (D.Moss. 1947) ($35 a week to $6,500 a year), Salter v. Becker
Roofing Co., 66 F.Supp. 688 (M.D. Ala. 1946), Troy v. Mohawk shop,
7 F.Supp 721 (M.D. Penna. 1946). ($50 to $55 per week).
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contractor, the courts have utilized the well-known "right
of control" test with varying results.'8

In considering whether the employment left was of a
"temporary" nature, the courts have given the same liberal

construction for the veteran and against the employer, and
even where a veteran acknowledged in writing that his em-

ployment was temporary the court held it not to be.17 Most
types of war plant work were held to be temporary-a prob-

lem which, in view of the dim prospect of cut-backs, will
not confront the veteran of the Korean War to the extent

it did the veterans of World War H1.18

In the event the

veteran had seasonal work, the test the courts have applied

is to determine whether or not the veteran had a regular
job to which he consistently returned during the specified
season each year; if so, his employment was not temporary. 19 In instances where the employee held a "working
permit" from the union and could have been replaced at any
time by an employee with a union "card", his employment

was still held not to be temporary. 20 Another problem has
arisen in those cases where the employee's work was unsatisfactory, but the employer held him on a temporary

basis until he was inducted. In such cases the veteran has
2
not been allowed his old job. 1
Recent magazine and newspaper articles indicate that
employers may refuse to hire, and promote, and on occasion

discharge those subject to be called under the draft laws.
The problem of discharge is one not likely to arise in union-

ized industry under present collective bargaining agree16Lee v. Remington Rand, Inc., 68 F.Supp. 837 (S.D. Calif. 1946);
Brown v. Luster, 16C F.2d 181 (9th Cir. 1947).
17 Grubbs v. Ingalls Iron Works, 66 F.Supp. 550 (N.D. Ala. 1946).
The fact the employee had worked for a year after his acknowledgement
of temporary employment may have had considerable bearing on the
result.
" Cases holding war work temporary: Olin Industries v. Barnett, 64
F.Supp. 722 (S.D. Ill. 1946) and Gualteri v. Sperry Gyroscope Co., Inc.,
67 F.Supp. 219 (E.D. N.Y. 1946).
" Bocterle v. Albert Robbins, Inc., 165 F.2d 942 (3rd Cir. 1947)
(holding the summer job as hotel manager is not temporary); cf. U.S.
ex rel. Unruh v. North American Creameries, 70 F.Supp. 36 (D. N.D.
1947) and U.S. ex re. Stanley v. Wimbish, 154 F.2d. 773 (4th Cir. 1946).
Coon v. Liebmann Breweries, Inc., 86 F.Supp. 333 (D. N.J. 1949).
Marque v. Stern, 88 F.Supp. 306 (M.D. Penna. 1950).
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ments, and it is doubtful the courts will permit the discharge
or placing of the prospective veteran on a temporary basis
merely for the purpose of evading the provisions of the Act.
In the case of the prospective veteran seeking employment,
the possibility of being placed on a temporary basis may
be to his advantage, for he may receive at least some employment-the employer being more willing to hire since
there will be no legal obligation to reemploy.
In order to qualify for reemployment the veteran need
not notify his employer that he is leaving to enter the armed
22
forces, a union agreement to the contrary notwithstanding.
But the veteran may have to make some concessions, e.g.
it has been held he cannot compel reemployment in the same
geographical location he left.P It. is doubtful though
whether, in the absence of special circumstances, a court
would allow the employer to require the veteran to take a
job any considerable distance from his old one, for such a
holding would in many instances allow the employer to
,evade the provisions of the Act. The special circumstances
of the case just cited were that the veteran's old job had
been unionized in his absence and he was not a member of
the union, nor did he desire to become one. The court
answered with the only practical solution.
In line with the policy of aiding the veteran, one court
has held a president of an insurance company who had been
elected was entitled to his old job. Generally results have
been the other way as to elected officials.24
Under the provisions of the 1940 Act it had been held
that if the employer's business had changed hands, i.e. had
been sold, the veteran was not entitled to reemployment. 25
While the new provisidns that the veteran is to be restored
by his employer or ". . . his successor in interest" appear
-"Anglin v. Chesapeake & O.Ry.Co., 77 F.Supp. 359

1948); cf. Bureau of Veteran's Employment Rights,
Field Letter No. 12, Sept. 30, 1949.
" Bozar v. Central Penna. Quarry & Stripping
(M.D. Penna. 1947).
1 Houghton v. Texas State Life Ins. Co., 166
1948); contra: Fraser v. Shoberg, 65 F.Supp. 83

(S.D. W.Va.

U.S. Dept. of Labor
Co., 73 F.Supp. 803
F.2d 848 (5th Cir.
(E.D. Wash. 1946)

(union official whose term had expired) and Trusteed Funds, Inc. v.
Dacey, 160 F.2d 413 (1st Cir. 1947) (director of a corporation).
25 DiLauro, Conway v. Riley's Tavern, Inc., 48 A.L.C. 826 (1948).
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without any explanation, it would seem to bind such a vendee. Of course, there may have occurred other changes
along with the sale of the business, but in such cases the
courts can resort to the safety valve of "changed circumstances".
The 1948 Act has another provision which is new to the
veterans' reemployment satutes. This provision, which
follows immediately the part quoted in the first part of this
division, is as follows:
"(ii) if not qualified to perform the duties of such position by reason of disability sustained during such service but qualified to perform the duties of any other position in the employ df such employer or his successor in
interest, be restored by such employer or his successor
in interest to such other position the duties of which
he is qualified to perform as will provide him like seniority, status, and pay, or the nearest approximation
thereof consistent with the circumstances in his case."
While no cases are known to have arisen under these provisions, it is highly probable that when such a case does
come before the courts they will not hesitate to construe the
provisions liberally in favor of the veteran. The basis of
the prediction is the fact that any conflict which may arise
will be between the veteran and employer, and the courts
have consistently favored the veteran, even though not
disabled. Add to that fact a natural sympathy for the cause.
of the disabled veteran and the prediction has even a
sounder basis.
If the veteran enlists subsequent to the passage of the
law in 1948 and after his term of enlistment expires, reenlists, he will not be allowed to claim reemployment rights
under the Act.2 6 If his enlistment is the first subsequent
2 The provisions applicable are §9 (g) (1) which reads: "Any person
who, subsequent to the date of enactment of this title and while it is in
effect, enlists in the armed forces of the United States (other than a
reserve component) for not more than three years shall, if such enlistment is his first enlistment in the armed forces or the Coast Guard
subsequent to the date of enactment of this title, be entitled, upon the
expiration of his enlistment (including any extension thereof by law
but not including any voluntary extension thereof) or upon his discharge under honorable conditions prior to the expiration thereof, to
all the reemployment rights and other benefits provided for by this
section in case of inductees."
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to the passage of the Act he will be entitled to such rights.
A simple illustration of what is meant is as follows: if one
enlists in the Armed Forces in 1949, he will be entitled to
reemployment at his old job in 1952 upon his discharge;
but if he should reenlist in 1952, he will not be entitled to
such rights at the expiration of the second term. A difficult'
problem might arise where one who enlisted subsequent to
the 1940 Act, let us say in 1941, reenlisted after the expiration of each three year term and finally is discharged in
1953. Can he assert the right to reemployment in his old
job? Under the 1940 Act, one court held that where a veteran had reenlisted for a three year term after the expiration of the first, he was entitled to reemployment on the
second discharge. By implication then in the supposed case,
it might be held that the veteran, after 12 years, would be
entitled to reemployment, since his last enlistment was subsequent to the passage of the 1948 Act and that he was at all
times within the protection of one of the Acts. Should such
a case arise the court might use one of the following two
provisos to bar the veteran: that he must be "qualified" to
perform his old duties or that the employer's circumstances
must not have so changed as to make it "unreasonable" to
reemploy him.
Although the provisions of the Act are not explicit, it
appears that if one is inducted after the enactment of the
law, say for a period of two years and thereafter enlists
for a period of three years, he would be entitled to reemployment. The emphasis here would have to be on the words
"if such enlistment is his first enlistment", as distinguished
from induction. In any instance where the veteran is
otherwise entitled to reemployment, an extension of his
term by law will not bar his claim.2
One other provision of the 1948 Act worthy of mention
at this point enables the veteran to obtain the services of
the United States district attorneys without cost, provided
however, that the district attorneys need not render such
service if they are not -reasonablysatisfied that the person
applying for such aid is entitled to the benefits.2 The dis-

The applicable provision is §9(d).
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cretion of the district attorney is wide and may on occasion
be abused,2 yet the only alternative to the plan in the statute
would seem to be for the government to pay the fees of
private attorneys. Such a plan would hardly be subject to
less abuse than the present one.
Problems Connected With the Discharge of the
Returned Veteran
The applicable provisions of the 1948 Act are found in
§9(c) (1) which reads. as follows:
"Any person who is restored to a position in accordance with the provisions of paragraph (A) or (B) of
subsection (b) . . . shall not be discharged from such
position without cause within one year after such restoration."
These provisions are identical with those of the Act of 1940
and any problems arising are likely to be governed by the
construction given by the courts to the 1940 provisions.
The problems as to discharge are closely allied to those
as to lay-off which will be discussed in connection with
seniority. As the Supreme Court has ruled, "discharge"
under the Act 'means termination of the employment relationship or loss of position." On the other hand, ". . . a
person who has been laid off by operation of a seniority
system and put on a waiting list for reassignment would
hardly be considered as having been 'discharged'. ' s° Though
this problem will be discussed more thoroughly in subsequent pages, it is worth noting here that had the Court held
the word "discharge" to include "lay-off", the effect would
have been to give the returned veteran a "super-seniority"
since the Act prohibits discharge for one year.
" In Iob v. Los Angeles Brewing Co., 183 F.2d 398 (9th Cir. 1950)
there seemed to be a bona fide dispute as to whether or not the contract
with the Teamsters was valid, and that question was one of the issues
in the pleadings, yet the government (Dept. of Justice) during the
course of the trial admitted the validity of the contract and then on
appeal just before default was to be entered against the veteran-appellants, the government asked to be substituted out the case on the ground
that previous decisions of the Supreme Court foreclosed any question
in the matter.
80 Fishgold v. Sullivan Drydock & Repair Corp., 328 U.S. 275 (1946)

at 286.
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Two problems of importance have arisen in connection
with the discharge of the veteran: what is discharge with
"cause', and when has the veteran waived his right to rely
upon the provisions against discharge.
In accord with the policy of aiding the veteran whenever
possible, the burden has been placed on the employer to
produce direct evidence of cause, e.g. of customers' complaints or "sassiness" of the employee.8 1 The effect of this
has been modified to some extent by the holdings that the
cause for discharge need not be a "legal cause"--a term yet
to be defined-but such cause as a fair-minded person may
act upon. 2 Of course, what might be such cause as a fairminded person may act upon will necessarily differ from one
type of employment to another: this test which was applied
to a professional baseball player is likely to yield a different
result when applied to a worker in a factory. It might be
difficult or impossible to prove a professional athlete is not
as capable as he was before the war, since his ability is to
some extent, measured by the skill of the opponents, and
the employer should as a practical matter be allowed considerable discretion. On the other hand it may be easier
of proof to show that one is not producing as much or doing
the same quality of work in a factory.
One of the most serious problems to arise was whether
the veteran, who returned to a job which had been unionized during his absence or after his return within the year,
was bound to join the union in order to keep his job. The
act itself seems to make no provision for this situation. In
a very recent case before the Circuit Court of Appeals in
the Ninth Circuit, the court said that assuming the closed
" Cord v. New York Cleaning & Dye Works, 88 F.Supp. 704 (D. Conn.
1948).
SSaundra v. St. Louis American League Baseball, 87 F.Supp. 471

(ELD. Mo. 1949). The term "legal cause" as used in connection with
the veteran's reemployment statutes seems to have originated in Keserich v. Carnegle-Illinois Steel Corp., 163 F.2d 899 (7th Cir. 1947) at

890. See also -Basham v. Virginia Brewing Co., 66 F.Supp. 718 (W.D.
Va. 1946) where use of vulgar and profane language with customers
contrary to company rules was held as a matter of law to constitute
eause under the Act. In other contexts the Federal Courts have said
that In order for something to be a "qegal cause" It must have been a
substantial factor in bringing about harm. Krauss v. Greenburg, 137
R.d 569, 572 (3rd Cir. 1943).
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shop contract was an -existing valid agreement, servicemen
who had been reemployed were under a duty to comply with
its terms in order to retain their employment under the
servicemen's employment statute, and that discharge for
failure to do so was with cause.33 No doubt it would have
been just as easy for the court to have said that the collective
bargaining agreement was made subject to the provisions
of the law affecting veterans and to have reached an opposite
result; but at this point a new policy factor enters plus the
fact that the hysteria of the war was over in 1949 when
the case was decided, and the cry of "help the veteran" had
grown dimmer.
There are several ways in which a veteran may waive
any claim he has under the act. For instance if he submits
the question of cause to an arbitration committee in accord
with a union contract he is bound by the committee finding. 4 Similarly, by transferring to a different part of the
industry, 3 or by a refusal to accept a job of like 'seniority
he waives his rights; but the employer may not promote the
veteran to a new job and then discharge him for-incompetence, since he still could have performed his 'old job and
did not waive his right thereto in taking a new one. 6
What Is the Status of the Veteran Upon His Reemployment.
By far the most important and seriously disputed question that will confront the veteran is the question of the
status he will occupy when he is reemployed. The, applicable provisions of the Act are as follows:
"(b) (B) ... such person shall.. be restored ... to
such position or to a pogition of like seniority, status or
pay; . . . . (c) (1) Any person who is restored to a
position in accordance with the provisions . . shall be
considered as having been on furlough or leave of ab-.
lob v. Los Angeles Brewing Co., Inc., 183 F.2d 398 (9th Cir. 1950);
accord: Jensen v. Baker, 48 A.L.C. 956 (1949), on the grounds that it
would have breached the employer's contract.
"U Van Vloten v. News Syndicate Co., 50 A.L.C. 617 (S.D. N;Y. 1949).
3 Walsh v. Chicago Bridge & Iron Co.,, 90 F.Supp. 322 (N.D. III.
1949); Bowen v. Home Beneficial Life Ins. Co. 50 A.L.C. 232 (1950)
(waiver by refusal to accept a position of like seniority),
O'Neill v. American Stores, 50 A.L.C. 252 (1950).
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sence during his period of training and service in the
armed forces, shall be so restored without loss of seniority, shall be entitled to participate in insurance or
other benefits offered by the employer pursuant to
established rules and practices relating to employees
on furlough or leave of absence in effect with the employer at the time such person was inducted into such
forces... (2) It is hereby declared to be the sense of
the Congress that any person who is restored to a position in accordance with the provisions of paragraph
(A) or (B) of subsection (b) should be so restored in
such manner as to give him such status in his employ.
ment as he would have enjoyed if he had continued in
such employment continuously from the time of his entering the armed forces until the time of his restoration
to such employment." (The italicized portion is new to
the 1948 Act.)
It is under like provisions in the 1940 Act that the veterans'
problems assumed their most controversial form.
It cannot be over-emphasized that the problem of the
veterans' status in reemployment involves a new and different policy consideration from that where the veteran is
merely seeking to be reinstated; here the conflict, when it
occurs, is between the veteran and the union. On the one
hand, the policy is and will be to help the votteran find
security upon his return from the service; on the other hand
is a labor agreement which as the Supreme Court has said,
".. is a code for the government- of an industrial enterprise and like all government, ultimately depends for its
effectiveness on the quality of enforcement of its code. 83T
Often the veterans' rights have been thought to come into
conflict with the seniority system. Rightly or wrongly, the
courts have cuitailed that liberality of construction-so frequent in adjudicating disputes between the veteran and the
employer-where such liberality would jeopardize a fundamental rule of industrial relations which has been relied
upon so heavily by both labor and management.
Though this is not the place to explain the workings or
the merits of the seniority principle, a few words will add
to the understanding of the cases to be analyzed. It is said
Trailmobile Co. v. Whirls, 331 U.S. 40 (1947), Mr. Justice Jackson
dissenting; Frankfurter J. concurring in the dissent.
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that the seniority system is second only to the wage and
union security provisions in importance to the workers. Its
function is to protect that large mass of unskilled and semiskilled workers in mass production industry who can be
easily replaced, and to afford maximum security and reward
to those who have rendered the longest service, and from
the workers' standpoint it provides an objective standard
of selection, eliminating favoritism and discrimination. In
short, it provides security for the worker 3 8 Though the seniority rights may vary under different agreements, as one
court has said, "the' term seniority has a well recognized
meaning. In the absence of specific limitation or enlargement, the right of seniority is the right of employees who
have served the longest to a preference as respects continuous employment."8 9
There are no cases to date under the provisions of the
1948 Act, but that part of the above provisions which was
in the 1940 Act has at different times been given four different interpretations. They were (1) that the veteran
was to be restored to a position of "super-seniority",40 (2)
that he was to be restored to a position where he would have
L4 1 (3) that he be
the identical seniority he had when he left.
considered as having been on the active payroll during his
time in the armed forces, and (4) that he be considered as
having been on the active payroll for some purposes and for
others as having been in the same position as a non-veteran

0 Mitchem, Seniority lauses in Collective BargainingAgreements.
21 Rocky Mt. L. Rev. 156 (1948). See also: "Union Agreement Provisions", Dept. of Labor Bull. 686 (1942) pp. 116-137.

m Droste v. Nash Kelvinator Corp., 64 F.Supp. 716 (E.D. Mich.
1946) at 721.

,0U.S. Sel.Service System, Local Bd.Memo. 190-A, May 20, 1944, Part
IV, 1 (c); 14 L.R.M. 2615.
"1 Hall v. Union Light, Heat & Power Co., 53 F.Supp. 817 (E.D. Ky.
1944); see also: comment by William Green, Pres., of A.F.L. inserted in

Congressional Record, 86 Cong.Rec. 10091 (1940).
2 Mentzel v. Diamond, 167 F.2d 299 (3rd Cir. 1948) the court said,

"The veteran is to be treated, so far as benefits under the act are concerned, as though he had worked every day at the plant"; See also:
Vznmuls' RmPLOyhZNT RIGuTs, 64 U.S. Dept. of Labor, Bur. Veterans'
Reemployment Rights (1950).
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on leave of absence. 43 It is true that the distinctions seem
to be narrow but upon the assertion of a particular claim
their importance is readily seen.
The consensus of opinion during the war-years seemed to
be that the Act granted to the veteran a position of "superseniority"." In other words, the view was that upon his
return the veteran would be entitled to take his old job back
even though it meant the loss of a job by a non-veteran with
greater seniority. This was the view taken by the administrative agency charged with the job of reinstating the veteran. 45 The Director of Selective Service set forth his views
as follows:46 "A veteran who has been reinstated to his
former position cannot be displaced by another on the ground
the latter has greater seniority rights. To permit such displacement would be to nullify the original reinstatement and
thus deprive the veteran of his reemployment rights under
the Act, and would be in effect a repeal of an Act of Congress. '" This interpretation was widely distributed and
many rights were granted to veterans as a result.47 But
many of the problems to arise were not foreseen and the
legislators themselves seemed to have doubts as to the feasibility of the provisions. 48 There can be but little question
that with the tightening up of industry after the war the
result of this view would have been to destroy, temporarily,

I"Monticue v. Baltimore & O.Ry.Co., 91 F.Supp. 561 (N.D. Ohio
1950), Brown v. Watt Car & Wheel Co., 91 F.Supp. 570 (S.D. Ohio 1949),
Flynn v. Ward Leonard Electric Co., 84 F.Supp. 399 (S.D. N.Y. 1950).

" For a discussion of the "super-seniority" argument often referred
to as a position of "absolute priority" see: Seniority andi Re-Employment of War Veterans, 54 Yale L.J..417 (1945).

0 Subsection (g) §8 of the 1940 Act provided that the Director of
Selective Service should establish a personnel division to render aid
to veterans in replacement in their former positions. Public Law 26,
80th Congress, transferred to the Secretary of Labor functions of the
Personnel Division of the Selective Training and Service Act on March
31, 1947. The Secretary of Labor pursuant to the authority granted in
the above Act has established within the Dept. of Labor, the Veterans'
Reemployment Rights Divsion, headed by a Director. The Act of 1948,
§9(h) leaves the work with the Dept. of Labor.
"U.S. Sel. Service System, Local Bd. Memo. 190-A, supra note 40.
ITFreeman v. General Motors Corp., 86 F.Supp. 527 (E.D. Mich.
1949) holding the company might withdraw rights granted on the basis
of an interpretation of the Act by the Director of Selective Service
which was subsequently overruled by the Supreme Court.
86 Cong.Rec. 10107-10109 (1940).
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a good share of what had been gained by the seniority system; it would have put older men out of work who had
thought themselves secured by the seniority system. The
question was then whether Congress had intended that the
veteran was to have a job for one year regardless of the
workings of the seniority system so that he might reestablish
himself in civilian life, or whether he was to fit back into
the seniority system.
The second of the four mentioned interpretations was
given by a district court in Hall v. Union Light, Heat& Power Co. 49 in which that court said that the veteran returned
to his job with the same seniority he had at the time of his
departure. The practical effect of this position would have
been a relative reduction in seniority for the veteran, for
though his seniority would stand still while he was in the
service, the seniority of those remaining on the job and
taking his place would increase. Therefore if this view had
been adopted, in many cases the veteran would have gotten
little, if any, benefit from the law.
Today the lawyer and the veteran have four Supreme
Court decisions to draw from. The first of those decisions,
Fishgold v. Sullivan Drydock & Repair Corp.,50 expressly
rejected the super-seniority argument and by implication
rejected the position taken in the Hall case. Said the Supreme Court, "He [the veteran] steps back on [the seniority
escalator] at the precise point he would have occupied had
he kept his position continuously during the War." Thus,
the veterans' seniority increased as if he had been on the
job instead of in the armed forces. The actual holding of
the case was that "lay-off" was not included in "discharge";
therefore an employer who had laid-off a veteran, favoring
a non-veteran with more seniority, had not violated the
statutory provisions on discharge.
In rejecting the "super-seniority" argument, the Court
reviewed the administrative interpretations; and, finding
that the National War Labor Board had placed a different
53 FSupp. 817 (E.D. Ky. 1944).

328 U.S. 275 (1946). Justice Black dissenting on grounds unrelated to the merits of the case.
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interpretation 51 upon the Act from that of the Director of
/Selective Service, it accepted that of the former for two
reasons: first, they had been in adversary proceedings; and
second, the fact there were various conflicting administrative rulings lent less credence to the contention that Congress had adopted one when the law was reenacted.
A point of interest in this litigation is that the District
Court held for the veteran against the employer, but the
Union,52 intervenor, appealed and the controversy was, in
Its final stages, between the veteran and the union. The
unions, it would seem, are seeking to uphold their own order
and enforce that "code for the government of industrial
enteiprise", i.e. while they are willing that the veteran
should be placed back on his job and hold the same relative
position of seniority that he left, they desire that in all other
respects the collective bargaining agreement should bind the
veteran.
Though the Fishgold case rejected the super-seniority
argument and the position of the district court in the Hall
case, It did not expressly decide whether the veteran was to
be considered as being on the active payroll or as a nonveteran on leave of absence. Under either of these possibilities the seniority of the veteran might accrue along with
that of workers remaining on the job; but since the practice In a particular industry may be that those on leave of
absence do not accrue seniority, the court by making no
exception, impliedly adopted the third of the four mentioned
interpretations, at least as to seniority.
In addition to the language above quoted the court in the
Fishuold case said, ". . and no practice of employers or
agreements between employer and union can cut down the
8eroice adjus8tment benefits which Congress has secured the
veteran under the Act." (Emphasis added.) The lower
Federal courts have taken this language out of context and
used it to declare invalid certain employer-union contracts.
Scoville Mfg..Co., 21 War Lab. Rep. 200, 201 (1944).
" Various Labor Unions took great Interest In the case and several
fied briefs as anicim carae,among them J. S. Padway and H. S. Thatcher for the A-.L, Lee Pressman, et al. for the CLO., and T. L. Mulholland, et al. for the Ry.Labor Executives Assoe. in support of the

respondent labor union.
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Other federal courts have declared the same contracts valid
by using the language first quoted. In 1947 and 1948 five of
these cases came before the Circuit Courts-four in the
Third Circuit" and one in the Ninth Circuit 5 4-- involving
modification of collective bargaining agreements while the
veteran was absent in the military service. The effect of
the contracts was that union chairmen should have top
seniority and in event of lay-offs union chairmen should be
retained over all others. In each case a veteran was "laidoff" within the statutory year while union chairmen with
less time with the company were retained. In the Third
Circuit the court by a two to one vote held against the veteran in all cases, while the court in the Ninth Circuit held
for the veteran. This court, as well as the dissenting judge
in the Third Circuit, relied upon the language last quoted
from the Fishgold case to the effect that collective bargaining agreements might not cut down the veterans' benefits,
and pointed in addition to the language of the Act that the
veteran "shall be so restored without loss of seniority."
In each of the cases the Union has intervened in the suit
and in the Campbell case the Union intervenor appealed.
The Supreme Court in Aeronautical Industrial District
Lodge #727 v. Campbell55 held that the veteran's rights
under the provisions of the 1940 Act were not infringed by
the modification of the agreements that existed at the time
the veteran entered the service. In so holding the court
relied upon the language of the Fishgold case that the veteran "steps back on [the seniority escalator] at the precise
point he would have been had he kept his position continuously during the war." The court reasoned that if the veteran had not been in the service he would have been subject
to the agreement as modified; therefore, he is now subject
to it. Only by making the assumption that had the veteran
remained on the job'the contract would have been changed
in the same manner it was, can the court reach the con11

Gaweller v. Elastic Stop Nut Corp., 162 F.2d 448 (3rd Cir. 1947),

Koury v. Elastic Stop Nut Corp., 162 F.2d 544 (3rd Cir. 1947), DiMaggio
v. Elastic Stop Nut Corp., 162 F.2d 546 (3rd Cir. 1947), and Payne v.
Wright Aeronautical Corp., 162 F.2d 549 (3rd Cir. 1947).
Campbell v. Lockheed Aircraft Corp., 169 F.2d 252 (9th Cir. 1948).
337 U.S. 521 (1949).
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clue-an it did. Yet the factual situation of Iob v. Los Angeles
Brewing Co., Inc.58 illustrates that the situation might well
arise where the remaining union members who are instrumental in making a change constitute only a minority of
the union if veterans are counted.
Here again there is a conflict between the alleged rights
of the veterans and the attempt of the union to strengthen
its organization. It is not unusual to provide in labor contracts that certain employees shall head the seniority list. 7
It is said the provisions for top seniority for union officials
are necessary for the maintenance of a stable and experienced union leadership as it enables the union to maintain
its organization when lay-offs occur. 5 In the Campbell case
the court inquired whether the act permitted contractual
seniority effective on induction to be changed to a different
contractual seniority and held that it did. In so holding
the court said that Congress had neither defined seniority
nor created a seniority system, but had recognized existing
systems; therefore, since seniority rights derive their scope
and significance from union contracts they are subject to
change by modification of those contracts, and the date of
employment is not made the inflexible basis for determining
seniority rights.
In 1947, in between the Fishgold and Campbell cases,
Trailmobile Co. v. Whirls19 came before the Supreme Court.
Whirls had been an employee of a subsidiary company which
consolidated with the parent Trailmobile Company. The
original agreement upon the consolidation was that the employees of each company should retain their relative seniority. The employees of Trailmobile, being the majority,
were dissatisfied with the agreement, voted to affiliate with
a new union (the C.I.O.),6° and thereafter negotiated a new
contract by which the former employees of the subsidiary
company should have their seniority run from the time of
the consolidation. This agreement so far as it affected
183 F.2d'398 (9th Cir. 1950).
Droste v. Nash Kelvinator Corp., supra note 39.
0 Matter of Glenn L. Martin Co., 19 War Lab. Rep. 263 (1944).
e

0 331 U.S..40 (1947).
0 The A.I.. would not back the Trailmobile employees in the demand that others be deprived of seniority.
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Whirls, reduced his seniority at a time when he had been
reemployed for over a year. The- Supreme Court held that
the reduction of seniority after a statutory year does not
violate the statute, since it does not discriminateagainst the
veteran as such. But, said Mr. Justice Jackson, dissenting,
".. the right to discharge after the year is not unconditional where the employee is the beneficiary of a seniority
plan. Of course, where employees have no seniority rights,
the guarantee of one year's employment is their only right.
But if a seniority system does exist, the Congress gave the
employees protection within the framework of seniority plus
a guarantee against demotion or termination without cause
for one year. (Emphasis added) Fishgold v. Sullivan Drydock & Repair Corp."8 1
The next and last Supreme Court case to consider the
problem of the veterans' seniority rights was Oakley v.
Louisville & Nashville Ry. 62 It was held in this case that
the veterans' statutory seniority continues beyond the first
year, with immunity against discriminatory changes. The
veteran, said the Supreme Court, "assumes upon his reemployment, the seniority he would have had if he had remained in his civilian employment. His seniority status
secured by this statutory wording continues beyond the first
year of his reemployment, subject to the advantages and
limitations applicable to other employees. The Act. added
special statutory protection, for 1 year, against certain types
of discharges or demotions that might rob the veterans'
reemployment of its substance, but the expiration of that
year did not terminate the right of the veteran to the seniority to which he was in the first instance entitled by -virtue
of the Act's treatment of him as though he had remained
continuously in his civilian employment."
I Whirls had been .discharged from his Job after he -had been expelled
from the union on grounds that he had negotiated for himself through
others than the union and acted in a way contrary and harmful to its
interest by testing his rights in the courts. Said; Justice Jackson on
this point, "One might have thought this an exaggerated fear conjured
up in hostility to the union except that it is just what happened and
instead of repudiating it now the union endorses its threat." '
338 U.S. 278 (1949). The court here acted on joint appeals and
reversed the court in Haynes v. Cincinnati, New Orleans & Tex. Ry.,
171 F.2d 128 (6th Cir. 1948).
-I
....
-
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The holdings .of the Supreme Court in the principal case
have been summarized as follows:" 'The seniority protected by statute at the end of the first year of reemployment
is not then (a) automatically lost, (b) removed from protection of statute, (c) barred from enforcement in the
courts by a 1-year statute of limitations, (d) opened to discriminatory reduction by employer or union, (e) made unchangeable in itself or its incidents in the absence of discrimination."
In recent months several cases have come before the
Federal Courts Two of these cases" may be dealt with
as one for both involved an attempt of a veteran to claim
time rendered in the service as fulfilling the requirement of
employment on the job in order to get vacations and vacation pay under a union agreement with the employer made
in the veteran's absence. In the Montice case the court in
effect held that, though as to seniority the veteran is to be
considered as having been on the active payroll, he is to be
considered- as having been on leave of absence in determining rights to other benefits." In so holding the court emphasized the language of the Act that the veteran, ". shall
be entitled to 'participate in insurance or other benefits
offered by the employer. pursuant to established rules and
practices relating to employees on leave of absence in effect
with the employer at the time such person was inducted into
such forces." (Emphasis added). Under this view while
the veteran may have his seniority changed by modification
of the collective bargaining agreement, not so with other
benefits, as to them the agreement at the time he "was inducted" is controlling and that cannot be changed. Though
the veteran might receive vacation pay on the basis of time
spent in the service, it would be only on condition the collective bargaining agreement expressly provided for such
benefits. Had the court taken the view that the veteran
Roaras, 67 (U.S. Dept. of Labor, Bur.
a Vmzs
R nuwEo
PMEN
Vet.Reemployment Rights 1950).
" MonUticue .v. Baltimore & O.Ry.Co., 91 F.Supp. 561 (N.D. Ohio

1950) and Brown v. Watt Car & Wheel Co., 91 P.Supp. 570 (S.D. Ohio

194).

a Thus the court took the fourth interpretation adverted to at the
beginning of this division.
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was to be considered as having worked on the job, he would
have been entitled to the greater vacation benefits. Such
a view would have been in accord with the 66Department of
Labor's interpretation of the Campbell case.
In the Monticue case it seems difficult to separate the
"seniority rights" from "other benefits". The contract there
provided that after 5 years continuous service the worker
would be entitled to two weeks vacation rather than one,
provided that 160 days of compensated work was performed
in each year. The five year requirement thus grants greater
benefits for greater seniority, even though the term "vacation" indicates "other benefits" than those normally associated with seniority.
Certiorari having beeA denied in the Brown case, there
are now opposing decisions in different circuits, for the
Third Circuit had already held that time in the service wasto be counted as time on the job and could be added in figuring out vacations based on length of service. This latter
view relied upon the principle that the veteran is to return
to the same position he would have occupied had he remained
on the job, and the court said, "The veteran is to be treatedso far as benefits under the act are concerned as though he
had worked every day at the plant."6 7
The same problem has arisen in a different form where
the veteran has attempted to claim retroactive pay under a
union contract for periods when he worked, yet was in the
service on the day that the contract prescribed he must be
on the active payroll in order to claim the retroactive.pay.
It has twice been held6 that the veteran lost the money he
would otherwise have received merely because he was not
working on a particular day. These cases point out an easy
means to evade the provisions of the Act by specifying in
the employer-union contract that the veteran- must be on
the job on a particular day to claim any benefits. Of course
the provisions would also have to be, applicable to other
employees on leave of absence or who had quit their jobs
at that date.

" VrzTA's

.RwxPi
RoHis,.supra note 63.
Mentzel v. Diamond, asvra note 42.
Flynn v. Ward Leonard Electric Co., 84 F.Supp. 399 (S.D. N.Y.
1950) and Zagalski v. Carboloy, Inc., 88 F.Supp. 162 (E.D. Mich. 1950).
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It is doubtful that the argument in favor of strengthening
the union organization by adhering to the collective bargaining agreement is applicable here. The union can gain nothing from such a technical construction of the collective bargaining agreement; the employer has a windfall at the veteran's expense. Perhaps the Third Circuit has recognized
this, for where a union contract provided vacation pay
could only be taken during the "current calendar year"
they held a veteran who performed work before induction
into the service did not have to comply with the contract
requirement that to claim such vacation one had to be on
the job "December 31".61
In another case,7 0 the Federal District Court for the Western District of Kentucky has held that under the statutory
provisions relating to "seniority rights", veterans who were
reemployed in their former jobs and who were thereafter
promoted to jobs of different classifications were entitled to
seniority in the new position as of the first date they performed their new jobs and not to retroactive seniority based
on a strong presumption that had they remained at their
work during the period of military service they would have
been promoted during that period. Even a more pro-veteran
court would probably fail to adopt such a presumption.
As has been indicated the Act of 1948 has a new provision
that, "It is hereby declared to be the sense of the Congress
that any person who is restored to a position in accordance
with the provisions of paragraph (B) of subsection (b)
should be so restored in such manner as to give him such
status in his employment as he would have enjoyed if he
had continued in such employment continuously from the
time of his entering the armed forces until the time of his
restoration to such employment."
One plaintiff has already attempted to invoke these provisions to count time in the service toward a vacation under
a collective bargaining agreement made during his absence,
* McLaughlin v. Union SwItch & Signal Co., 166 l'.2d 46 (3d Cir.
1948).
" Gregoroy v. Louisville & NM.R.Qo., 92 F.Supp. 770 (W.D. Ky.

1950); but cf. Conner v. Pennsylvania R.R.Co., 177 F.2d 854 (D.C. Cir.
1949).
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but the court ruled against him since his induction was
prior to the adoption of the provisions so that he did not
come within them. 71
Though the new section does not indicate on its face
whether it was intended only to affect seniority or whether
it was to include other benefits such as vacations and retroactive pay increases, the implication seems to be that it will
only affect his seniority and that it was designed to affirm
the Fishgold case rather than introduce any new change in
the law. 72 The old provisions remain that as to "other benefits" the veteran shall te governed by practices relating to
employees on furlough or leave of absence. The only method
by which the two provisions can be construed together with
any degree of consistency is to interpret the new provisions
as applying only to seniority, using seniority narrowly.
Any other construction will render nugatory the provisions
that, as to "other benefits", the veteran is to be treated as
being on leave of absence.
Conclusions and Recommendations
We have then, at the present time, a statute for the reemployment of veterans closely modeled after the reemployment statute for the veterans of World War II. There are
some new additions to this statute which tend to aid in its
construction, and yet there are still many gaps; those same
gaps existed in the 1940 Act. The courts, as we have seen,
have filled a part of them. There were no magic words in
the Act that commanded the courts to follow one line of
policy more than another. There were no enlightening clues
as to what Congress had really intended, but on the contrary, an indication of confusion and lack of understanding.
Cushnier v. Ford Motor Co, 89 F.Supp. 491 (E.D. Mich. 1950).
Sen. Rep. No. 1268, 80th Cong., 2d Sess. reports on §9(c) (2) as
follows: "Statement of policy regaiding application of the "escalator
principle". The provisions of this legislation differ from those contained in the [1940 Act] in that it is specifically stated to be the intent
of Congress that persons restored to Federal or private employment be
restored so as to give them the status they would have enjoyed if they
71
7

had remained in such employment

.

.". The implication comes from

the reference to the "escalator principle" which originated in the Fishgold case in connection with seniority.
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The courts adopted a liberal attitude when the veterans'
conflict was with the employer; an attitude in accord with
public policy and"public opinion that the returned veteran
should be given every "break", even though it entailed some
sacrifice on the part of the employer. The Act did not
command this; as shown, there was a safety valve. When
that same conflict was with the union, the courts curtailed
their liberality and gave to the veteran only that which
involved no risk of loss of anything the union had built up
and no risk to those who remained in their employment during the war, when the veteran was called upon to defend the
nation. The Act did not command this construction either,
and the Director of Selective Service, who was given the
original job of interpreting the Act, was definitely of the
opinion that such construction was wrong. There would
seem to be an inconsistency in this type of construction. Is
there anything more sacred about unions than employers
so that one cannot be called upon to make sacrifices and the
other can? Surely if there. was the legislators did not so
indicate. The distinction then must be in the philosophy of
the particular court; it is not in the Act.
The, lower federal courts, trying somehow to follow both
the statute and the Supreme Court's decisions, have watched
too closely the collective bargaining agreements and have
justified their decisions upon a technical construction of the
statute. In doing so they have often injured the veteran
and incidentally contributed to the coffers of industry.
While the instances are many, one example will serve to
illustrate. Where a veteran has worked for two years under
a plan providing for increased vacations after five years,
and thereafter his place has been taken for two years by a
non-veteran, who is replaced by the veteran on his return,
the courts have held the veteran is not entitled to the increased vacation after reemployment for a year, yet at all
times the employer has had someone on the job. The result
is that the employer gets an employee for the full five years
but does not have to provide extra vacation benefits for two
or three more years. Should the courts continue to solve
the veterans' rights on the basis of a rigid construction of
the collective bargaining agreement, a veteran who had
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worked two years before induction and three after discharge
might be held not to come within the provisions of a 5-year
continuous service contract which provides for greater vacations-barring him becouse of the non-continuous aspect.
Such a holding would be a windfall to the employer at the
veteran's expense and work an undesirable forfeiture by
the veteran.
Another example of even blinder adherence to the collective bargaining agreement is illustrated by those courts
that have refused the veteran his retroactive pay where he
was inducted a few days prior to the exact date specified in
the agreement that he must be at work to claim such pay.
Such a decision can benefit neither veteran nor union, but
only industry. Paradoxically then, in their zeal to come
to the aid of organized labor those courts have unwittingly
aided the employer to the injury of the veteran.
A part 6f the solution to the problem lies in a final decision
by Congress as to what the veteran is supposed to have been
given. More specifically, was it intended that the veteran
should come back to his job after discharge from the service
and take that job subject to the same hazards of lay-off and
loss of benefits and seniority to which he would have been
subject had he not entered the service; or was it intended
that he should be given something more than merely his
job back, and if so how much more?
Once this major policy decision is made, the provisions of
the statute, indicated by the decisions to be capable of numerous interpretations, must be made more explicit.
The labor union itself, in conjunction with the employer,
can do much to eliminate these problems by making specific
provisions in the collective bargaining agreements providing for the distribution of benefits to those who enter the
military service. In view of the avowed intention of the
present Administration to maintain a large military force,
it will be necessary for both employer and union to adjust
to the circumstance of employees entering and returning
from the armed forces quite frequently. Collective bargaining agreements should be planned accordingly.
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Herewith is submitted a redrafting of important parts
of the statute:
§9 (c) (1) Any person who is restored to a position in
accordance with the provisions of paragraph (A) or
(B) of subsection (b) shall be considered as having
accrued seniority during his period of training and
service; shall be entitled to participate in insurance,
vacations, and other benefits offered by the employer
pursuant to established practices and rules relating to
employees on furlough or leave of absence in effect with
the employer at the time such person was inducted into
such forces, provided however that whenever such person shall replace a non-veteran who has been employed
for the purpose of filling the veteran's job, the time of
such non-veteran shall be counted toward vacation benefits of the veteran, unless such non-veteran shall remain employed in some other capacity; and the veteran
shall not be discharged from such position without cause
within one year after such restoration to such employment, nor be laid-off within one year, so long as there
remains employment which he can perform.
(2) After the expiration of the first year of such employment the veteran shall no longer be entitled to such
super-seniority but shall be subject to the same hazards
of employment as those of like seniority.
(3) Any person who is so restored under the provisions
of paragraph (B) of subsection (b) shall not be denied
any benefits to which he would otherwise be entitled by
reason of his presence in the armed forces on a particular day or by reason of non-continuous employment.
These provisions can only be used if the attitude is taken
that the man who leaves his job to take up arms at little pay
and at the risk of his own life is entitled upon his return
to his old job for one year without being subject to the usual
hazards of employment so that he might reestablish himself. The necessary corollary of this position is that it may,
though it will not in every instance, call for a sacrifice on
the part of those who remain-employee, employer and
union alike. It is the view of the writer that those who
would not countenance such a provision are those who
wouid place upon a few the burden of the nation's battles.
RAY GuVEs.

